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Legal Consequences of Force Majeure
Under German, Swiss, English
and United States' Law
DR. THEO RAUH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Long-term contracts, whether for the turnkey construction of a
plant, the construction of works or installations, or for the periodic
supply of goods, frequently face the problem that the economic,1 politi-
cal2 and/or natural3 surroundings change far more than the parties
contemplated or expected when they signed the contract. This is espe-
cially true for long-term construction contracts where a European or
North-American contractor agrees to perform construction work in a
third world country. Here, subsequent events which render the per-
formance of the contractor's obligation radically different from what
was originally contemplated occur much more often than in a domestic
contract. The possible risks in the performance of such a long-term
contract are so numerous that they cannot reasonably be considered
when the contract is signed.
In view of these imponderable risks, the parties often agree to add
a Force Majeure Clause. These clauses are worded much like the fol-
lowing:
In the Contract "force majeure" shall mean any occurrence outside
the control of the parties preventing or delaying their performance
of the contract.
Force majeure shall mean extraordinary events independent of the
Parties' will that cannot be foreseen or averted by them even with
due diligence, being beyond their control and preventing the Con-
tracting Party/or Parties/ from fulfilling the obligation(s) undertak-
en in this Contract.
The expression "force majeure" shall mean circumstances which
were beyond the control of the party concerned exercising the stan-
dard care of a reasonable and prudent operator.
* Law studies at Universitit Trier and University of East Anglia in Norwich,
LL.M., 1989, doctoral degree for comparative studies on Frustration and Force Ma-
jeure in Contract Law, Universitat Trier, 1992; admitted to the Superior Court of
Diisseldorf in 1993; member of the law firm of Scholz, Kraatz, Dittman & Partner.
1. E.g., inflation, increase in the price of raw materials.
2. E.g., civil unrest, revolution, war.
3. E.g., flood, earthquakes, storms.
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Most clauses of this type require four essential criteria for an event to
qualify as Force Majeure:
1) the event must be external;
2) it must render the performance radically different from that
originally contemplated;
3) it must have been unforeseeable (objective standard) or at least
unforeseen (subjective standard); and
4) its occurrence must be beyond the control of the party con-
cerned.
These criteria are also required by the definition of Force Majeure
under most national legal systems.' In this respect the term Force
Majeure is described as "Wegfall der Geschdftsgrundlage" (destruction
of the basis of the contract-Germany and Switzerland), "frustration"
(England) and "impracticability" (United States).
Parties often, however, pay less attention to Force Majeure claus-
es. These clauses are generally included under "Miscellaneous" and
their wording as well as their structure is not as detailed and accurate
as they should be. Quite frequently, the contractual Force Majeure
Clause broadly articulates the definition of a Force Majeure event
without delineating the legal consequences to follow the occurrence of
a Force Majeure event. To remedy this omission, the parties would
have to insert detailed and lengthy provisions dealing with the effect of
a Force Majeure event on the contractual duties already and still to be
performed, provisions responding to questions such as: on what basis is
work already performed to be calculated if such work is of no further
use for the employer? can the contractor claim compensation for invest-
ments already made but not yet visible for the employer? etc. Instead
of dealing with these complicated questions, the parties hope that a
Force Majeure event will not happen and leave the determination of its
effects to the applicable law - to the principles developed in each of
the jurisdictions with respect to Wegfall der Geschdftsgrundlage, frus-
tration or impracticability.
This note will examine the effects of Force Majeure clauses under
German, Swiss, English and American law, and how these effects
greatly differ. The legal consequences of a recognized Force Majeure
vary from a judicial adjustment for the altered circumstances to a
division of loss to annulment of the contract.
4. Cf. THEO RAUH, LEISTUNGSERSCHWERUNGEN IM SCHULDVERTRAG (1992) (deal-




II. PRESERVATION OF THE CONTRACT UNDER MODIFIED CONDITIONS
A. Alteration of the Contract by the Court
1. Germany
Under German law, not every destruction of the basis of the
transaction results in per se legal consequences. The principle of pacta
sunt servanda may only be breached if it is in general unreasonable to
expect the obligor to fulfill the contract. In Machine Games,' the Fed-
eral Supreme Court stated that the destruction of the basis of the
transaction only has legal consequences where called for given the
totality of circumstances and where necessary in order to avoid results
which are intolerable and in general incompatible with law and justice.
Consequently, "unreasonableness" has a double function: in addition to
determining whether the basis of the transaction has been destroyed,
it serves to determine the legal consequences.6
If the relationship between the parties largely breaks down, then
a modification of the contract for the changed circumstances is to be
considered first. The primacy of adjustment follows from the principle
of pacta sunt servanda, since an adjustment encroaches less severely
on the contract. In this respect, the contractual relationship as such is
maintained. Modifying the contract to the changed circumstances
should ensure that continuing the contract is reasonable for both par-
ties.7 Contract modification, because of its flexibility, is particularly
suited to taking individual circumstances into account,8 and every
possible restructuring of the contract can, in principle, be achieved.
The following types are possible:
" comprehensive reform of the contractual relationship, which can
go so far as to replace the original obligation with a completely
new one.
9
" partial restructuring of the contractual relationship"
" partial preservation of the contract"
" alteration of the contractual obligation 2
* increase in the amount payable"3
5. BGH 20.31967.WM 1967 (561) (F.R.G.).
6. KARL LARENZ, GESCHAFTSGRUNDLAGE UND VERTRAGSERFULLUNG: DIE
BEDEUTUNG "VERANDERTER UMSTANDE" IM ZIVILRECHT (3d ed. 1963).
7. VOLKER EMMERICH, DAs RECHT DER LEISTUNGSSTORUNGEN 321 (1984).
8. BGHNJW 1972 (580) (F.R.G).
9. BGHJZ 1952, 145 (146) (F.R.G.).
10. BGHNJW 1953, 1585 (1586) (F.R.G.).
11. LM § 242 Nr.12 Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB).
12. BGHNJW 1954, 1323 (supply of alternative current instead of direct current)
(F.R.G.).
13. BGHZ 1991, 32 (36) (F.R.G.).
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" grant of additional equalization claim 4
" reduction of the contractual performance 5
" postponement of performance"6
2. Switzerland
a. Basic Admissibility of an Alteration of the Contract
A modification of the contract aligns it to the new circumstances.
The contractual relationship as such is maintained. Scholarly opinion
concerning judicial contract modification is very different from that
concerning annulment. The older textbooks, in general, apply the prin-
ciple clausula rebus sic stantibus and reject contract modification.
Some authors would only permit an alteration of the contract if the
contracting parties wished or appeared to desire to preserve the con-
tract. 7
More recent commentaries, however, express no reservations
about granting the judge competence to alter the contract. In principle,
they acknowledge the alteration of the contract.'" In one of its funda-
mental decisions, the Federal Court, based on the principles enshrined
in Art. 373(2) Law of Obligations, allowed judicial alteration of the
contract instead of annulment. The Federal Court continues to strictly
adhere to this practice. 9
b. Restrictions on Alteration of the Contract
As with contract dissolution, in a case cf contract alteration the
principle of private autonomy requires that the judge take into account
the parties' agreements concerning the consequence of adjustment. If
neither party wishes to continue the contract with altered contents or
if both parties request that the contract be dissolved, even with differ-
ent effects, then the judge must dissolve the contract. In long-term and
economically significant contracts, the parties normally have a greater
interest in preserving than in dissolving the contract." Weighing the
interests of the parties, the judge will focus on the particular concrete
facts of the case, for example, on new offers of contracts.
14. RG 21.6. 1933, RGZ 141, 212, 217
15. LM § 242 Nr.33 BGB (F.R.G.).
16. LM § 284 Nr.2 BGB (F.R.G.).
17. JACQUES BISCHOFF, VERTRAGSRISIKO UND CLAUSULA REBUS SIC STANTIBUS:
RIsIKOZUORDNUNG IN VERTRAGEN BEI VERANDERTEN VERHALTNISSEN 233 (1983).
18. PETER JAGGI & PETER GAUCH, ZORCHER KOMMENTAR, OBLIGATIONENRECHT, 3
Aufl. (3d ed.) no. 635/636 to § 18 Law of Obligations (1980); PIERRE TERCIER, La
clausula rebus sic stantibus en droit suisse des obligations, 127 JOURNAL DES
TRIBUNAUX 194, 210 (1979).
19. BundesGerichts Entscheidungen [BGE] 97 II 398; BGE 68 II 173 (Switz).
20. BISCHOFF, supra note 17, at 234.
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c. Possibilities for Alteration
(i). Alteration of the Content of the Contract
The first possibility for altering the contract is to restructure the
content of the contract. The judge has a number of options. The judge
may postpone the date on which performance is due, order payment by
installments, authorize partial performance, delete an agreement to
pay interest, or redetermine the place of performance.21 Adjustments
of the contract increasing one party's obligation or reducing the other
party's obligation are of great significance in practice. For example, the
Federal Court settled the grossly disproportionate lease obligations re-
sulting from an extraordinary increase in the price of coal by appropri-
ately increasing the interest rate.22
The Federal Court also raised the contractual obligations in a case
involving the reevaluation of debts in German Marks. Both pecuniary
obligations and obligations in kind may be reduced (in so far as they
do not involve specific goods). In order to meet changed economic con-
ditions, the rent in a lease for operating a restaurant on ships on Lake
Lucerne was reduced from Swiss Francs 40,000 to Swiss Francs
17,000.2 Obligations for performances in kind can also be adjusted
for altered circumstances by reducing the quantity of goods owed while
the counter-performance remains unchanged.24
(ii). Alteration of the Duration of the Contract
The judge may also shorten or lengthen the duration of the con-
tract.2 Such adjustment may be required if the restoration of normal
circumstances (e.g., conclusion of a peace treaty, removal of an export
prohibition) can be expected shortly and the obligor could then perform
the contract after an appropriate extension of the contract.2 .
3. Anglo-American Law
a. Common Law
Both English and American 27 common law give the judge abso-
21. JAGGI & GAUCH, supra note 18, at no. 635 to art. 18 Law of Obligations.
22. BGE 47 II 318 (Switz).
23. BGE 48 II 252 (Switz).
24. BGE 47 II 454 (Switz).
25. JAGGI & GAUCH, supra note 18, at nos. 573/574, 635/636 to art. 18 Law of
Obligations.
26. BGE 44 II 526-27 (Switz.) (contract was extended for six months).
27. EwAN MCKENDRICK, Frustration and Force Majeure-Their Relationship and A
Comparative Assessment, in FORCE MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT 38
(1991).
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lutely no power to alter legal rights with respect to a concluded con-
tract. In British Movietonews Ltd. v. London & Dist. Cinemas Ltd.,28
the Court of Appeals made its only attempt to override this principle.
In this case, the defendants (cinema owners) had agreed to obtain
films exclusively from the plaintiffs, (wholesale film distributors) for
the period when a statutory instrument was in force. This statutory
instrument had been passed in 1943 under the Emergency Powers (De-
fence) Act 1939. Its purpose was the preservation of public life during
the war by allocating the few available films evenly.
At the end of the war, however, this Statutory Instrument was not
repealed, but was simply included in another statute (Supplies and
Services [Transitional Powers] Act 1945). In this context the Statutory
Instrument had a completely different purpose, serving to protect Ster-
ling currency against film imports from countries with hard curren-
cy 29. Based on this change of purpose, the defendants pled frustration
since they had concluded the original contract on completely different
grounds - shortage of films during war - which no longer existed.
Lord Denning believed that the court only had the power to adjust
a contract to the changed situation if the contract could be interpreted
as recognizing such an intent by the parties. However, he never ad-
dressed the question of whether an essential change of the original
content of the obligation had arisen:
In these frustration cases, the court really exercises a qualifying
power-a power to qualify the absolute, literal or wide terms of the
contract-in order to do what is just and reasonable in the new situ-
ation. The court qualifies the literal meaning of the words so as to
bring them into accord with the contemplated scope of the contract.
Even if the contract is absolute in its terms, nevertheless, if it is
not absolute in intent, it will not be held absolute in effect."0
This statement was rejected, on one hand, because it made the
criterion of radical change of the obligation superfluous and, on the
other hand, it would introduce the principle of clausula rebus sic stan-
tibus into English contract law.31 Therefore, it is not surprising that
Lord Denning's statement caused some concern in the House of Lords
and Lord Denning's decision was overturned.32 Viscount Simon held
28. 2 All E.R. 390 (1950).
29. Clive Schmitthoff, Frustration of International Contracts in English and Com-
parative Law, in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL SCIENCE: SOME PROBLEMS
OF NON-PERFORMANCE AND FORCE MAJEURE IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS OF SALE
126, 135 (1961).
30. British Movietonews Ltd. v. London & Dist. Cinemas Ltd., 2 All E.R. 390,
395 (1950).
31. Schmitthoff, supra note 29, at 136.




that the requirements for frustration were not fulfilled:
The suggestion that an uncontemplated turn of events is enough to
enable a court to substitute its notion of what is just and reason-
able... leads to some misunderstanding." Though the legislative
authority behind the words of the order is altered, the words them-
selves mean the same thing. This is not a case in which there has
been a vital change of the law.84
Consequently, the only legal effect which comes into question is the
annulment of the contract.
b. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615 does not make any express
provision for the legal effects; it is evident from Comment 6 that this
provision however does not exclude the possibility of adjustment: 5
In situations in which neither sense nor justice is served by either
answer when the issue is posed in flat terms of excuse or no excuse,
adjustment under the various provisions of this Article is neces-
sary, especially the sections on good faith, on insecurity and assur-
ance and on the reading of all provisions in the light of their pur-
poses, and the general policy of this Act to use equitable principles
in furtherance of commercial standards and good faith.
All the same, the overwhelming majority of decisions continue to pro-
ceed on the assumption that there are generally the two alternatives of
preservation and annulment.
The first case in which the contract was adjusted was the ALCOA
case.8 ALCOA had entered into a long-term supply contract for the
conversion of minerals into aluminum (toll conversion service contract).
The contract contained a price adjustment clause, whereby the parties
chose the wholesale price index for industrial goods as an objective
measure for the alteration of non-operation related production costs.
However, when OPEC began to raise the price of crude oil in 1973 and,
in addition, unexpected environmental protection measures greatly
increased ALCOA's electricity costs, the rate of increase of the non-
operation related production costs considerably exceeded the rate of
increase of the index.
33. Id. at 625.
34. Id. at 623.
35. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 272(2) (1981) ('In any
cases governed by the rules stated in this Chapter, if those rules . . . will not avoid
injustice, the court may grant relief on such terms as justice requires including
protection of the parties' reliance interests.").
36. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (1980)
[hereinafter ALCOA].
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ALCOA stated that the parties had proceeded on the assumption
that the wholesale index was to be an objective measure of ALCOA's
non-operation related production costs. It further stated that the mutu-
al error on this fundamental consideration led to a significant imbal-
ance in the mutual obligations and required-on the basis of a total loss
for ALCOA of US $ 75,000,000-an alteration of the contract. In abso-
lute figures the price increase was 500%.
After the court affirmed the existence of Force Majeure, it refused
to terminate the contract since this would give the plaintiffs business
an unexpected profit, because ALCOA could only conclude a contract
on increased present prices. The court further stated that the comple-
tion of a long-term contract required a careful examination of the cir-
cumstances of the contract, the intent of the parties and the superven-
ing event.
The court, no doubt impressed by the huge sum involved, admit-
ted that in certain cases terminating the contract was the only appro-
priate option. The court further stated that if the defendant wished to
secure a long-term supply of aluminum at a price which still allowed it
to make a profit and if the plaintiff had a continuing interest in the
contract based on its desire for the full use of its production capacities,
then both parties had the same interest in a long-term relationship.
The court held that an adjustment was the suitable legal remedy since
it came closest to the intentions and expectations of the parties and
avoided inequities."
On the basis of its superior expert knowledge the court even con-
sidered itself more able than the parties themselves to adjust the con-
tract. The court declared that it possessed "information from hindsight
far superior to that which the parties had when they made their con-
tract."" After considering the original contract and the expectations
of the parties, the court drafted the following price clause:
For the duration of the contract the price for each pound of alumi-
num converted by ALCOA shall be the lesser of the current Price A
or Price B indicated below. Price A shall be the contract ceiling
price computed periodically as specified in the contract. Price B
shall be the greater of the current Price B1 or B2. Price B1 shall be
the price specified in the contract, computed according to the terms
of the contract. Price B2 shall be that price which yields ALCOA a
profit of one cent per pound of aluminum converted. 9
In addition, the court fixed the invoice arrangements and rules for
mutual provisions of information (in part for up to two years after
37. Id. at 78.
38. Id. at 91.
39. Id. at 80.
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expiration of the contract).4
There are several approving comments"' on the ALCOA decision.
Supporters of judicial adjustment consider it a decisive step toward
allowing judicial changes of contractual duties according to fairness 2
and flexibility.
B. Allocation of Loss
1. Germany
In some German cases a division of the loss comes into question
as a legal consequence of the disappearance of the basis of the transac-
tion.' The assumption underlying the basic principle of determina-
tion of loss is that the loss resulting from the contractual breakdown is
to be appropriately fixed and allocated between the parties with con-
sideration given to the interests of both parties," their economic cir-
cumstances"5 and the originally expected profits. 6
In a case which occurred under the equalization of burdens legis-
lation,"'7 a seller who had sold a war-damaged piece of land with a
house for the price of DM 8,000. demanded compensation from the
purchaser in the amount of DM 10,000, which was granted to him by
the competent equalization of burdens authority for the property. The
Federal Supreme Court held that an equal division of the respective
advantages and disadvantages between the two contracting partners
was appropriate." The court granted the plaintiff DM 5,000 because
the grant of such a claim for equalization would always be possible
when the continued enforcement of the contract would lead to a result
which was intolerable and no longer compatible with law and equity.
An equal allocation of the loss is, by no means, a rigid principle; rath-
er, all the circumstances of the case must be considered and valued to
achieve an equitable and just equalization. This includes considering
whether or not one of the parties has accepted a greater risk. Conse-
quently, every possibility of allocation is open to the court. 9
40. Id.
41. Michael N. Zundel, Equitable Reformation of Long-term Contracts-The 'New
Spirit" of ALCOA, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 985, 1001; see also J.G. Ryan, Note, UCC § 2-
615, Excusing the Impracticable, 60 B.U. L. REV. 575, 596 (1980).
42. Zundel, supra note 41, at 1000.
43. GERHARD KEGEL ET AL., DIE EINWIRKUNG DES KRIEGES AUF VERTRAGE IN DER
RECHTSPRECHUNG DEUTSCHLANDS, FRANKREICHS, ENGLANDS UND DER VEREINIGTEN
STAATEN VON AMERIKA 127 (1941).
44. Id. at 403.
45. OLG Nuremberg, 29.4.1971, RdL 1971, 322, 323.
46. KEGEL, supra note 43, at 127.
47. BGH LM No. 41 to § 242 Buirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB].
48. See also BGH 8.2.18.1984, NJW 1984, 1746, 1747; BGH 23.11.1989, NJW
1990, 572, 573.
49. See OLG Nuremberg, supra note 45, at 322-23. "An allocation as to 2/3 and
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2. Anglo-American law
Due to the general reluctance of Anglo-American courts to
adjust the contract, it is not surprising that in only one case has the
court allocated the loss. The National Presto Case5" was based on a
mutual error of the parties concerning the level of further contractual
costs and not on impracticability.
There are many opinions on impracticability which also demand
an allocation of the loss in cases of commercial impracticability."' The
reason given is that it is equitable that both parties, having landed in
a losing situation without any fault, should share the loss. Both par-
ties would probably have profited if the contract had been properly
implemented; therefore, why should they not then also bear the loss-
es?52
C. Pro-rata Performance
Where a seller has concluded several contracts for the delivery of
specific goods and the supply of those goods subsequently becomes
restricted, the restriction frustrates the seller's ability to fulfil all his
obligations to supply. The question then becomes how to distribute the
remaining goods.
1. United States of America
Both the Common Law53 and the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-
615 provide for the allocation of available goods" instead of dissolving
one contract because of impracticability and declaring the other con-
tracts capable of being fully performed. There is, however, no fixed
allocation standard, so that the seller has some room for discretion in
the distribution.55
In the Atlantic Richfield6 cases, an oil company was forced to
limit supplies to its customers because of a gasoline shortage in the
1/3 is the appropriate legal result." Id.
50. National Presto Indus. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
51. Glanville L. Williams, The End of Chandler v. Webster, 6 MOD. L. REV.
(1942) 46, 50 (1942).
52. Id.
53. See Acme Mfg. v. Arminius Chem. Co., 264 F. 27 (4th Cir. 1920); See also
Yuba v. Mattoon, 325 P.2d 162 (Cal. App. 1958); Amsden Lumber Co. v. Stanton,
294 P. 853 (Kan. 1931).
54. See Intermar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82 (D. Pa. 1973);
See also Mansfield Propane Gas Co. v. Folger Gas Co., 231 Ga. 868 (Sup. Ct. 1974);
Terry v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d. 962 (1977).
55. J. White, Allocation of Scarce Goods Under Sec. 2.615 UCC: A Comparison of
Some Rival Models, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 503 (1978).
56. Terry v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d. 962 (1977); Intermar, Inc. v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82 (D. Pa. 1973).
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United States and the United Kingdom arising out of the oil crisis and
because of a state regulation requiring the company to keep certain
amounts in storage. In order to guarantee an equal supply to all cus-
tomers the following distribution scheme was applied:
Until further notice, our sales of gasoline to you will be limit-
ed to (104%) of our sales to you during the comparable calendar
month of 1972, except in those cases where a different basis is
approved due to such factors as the lack of 1972 sales history or the
occurrence of a material intervening event. 7
Where no comparable figures for 1972 existed, the consumption of the
individual petrol station was estimated by the suppliers based on such
details as size and position. Two petrol station tenants took action
against this. The plaintiff in the first case argued that, although no
comparable figures were available for 1972, the value estimated by the
suppliers was far too low58 and was done deliberately to drive him
from the market. The second plaintiff claimed an inequitable hardship
since the petrol station had only opened in 1971 and the current turn-
over was much higher.59 In both cases the courts upheld the alloca-
tion formula. On the basis of the UCC § 2-615 (b) requirement that the
allocation be fair and reasonable, the focus of the inquiry was on
whether unequal treatment or discrimination in comparison with the
other petrol station tenants was evident. "The fact that plaintiff, under
the allocation formula, receives less than its marketing needs is the
result of its lack of sales history in 1972 rather than the result of any
arbitrary and discriminatory conduct by the defendant." ° Conse-
quently, whether better and more exact methods for calculating the
comparison standard existed was irrelevant. What mattered was that
both the disadvantages and the advantages of the allocation formula
were shared equally amongst the customers. These principles of pro-
rata performance are applied in the same way when the contract con-
tains a Force Majeure clause.
2. Germany
German law also allows a pro-rata performance in cases where
the basis of the transaction is destroyed.61 When the seller of specific
restricted goods encounters difficulties in obtaining these goods with-
57. Intermar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82 (D. Pa. 1973).
Intermar, supra note 54, at 90.
58. Id.
59. Terry, 72 Cal. App. 3d at 962.
60. Intermar, 364 F.Supp. at fn 54; See also Terry 72 Cal. App. 3d at fn 54, at
968. "The statutory demand for a fair and reasonable allocation denotes a collective
quality characterizing the supplier's treatment of his customers as a group .... All
dealers were treated alike." Id.
61. RG 3.2.1914, RGZ 84, 125; RG 22.10.1920, RGZ 100, 134.
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out any fault on his part, and when these difficulties constitute an
unreasonable demand on him such that he can no longer comply with
his obligations, then he may reduce the supply to his customers pro-
portionately. At the same time, he is exempted from claims for damag-
es under § 242 of the German Civil Code.
In the Sugarbeet Seeds case,62 the Supreme Court of the German
Reich' permitted a seller, who had sold a specific amount of sugar-
beet seeds for several years in advance, to allocate the seeds propor-
tionately amongst all purchasers when events of nature reduced the
harvest so that there were no longer sufficient supplies. The Federal
Supreme Court said that in these cases, the seller's obligees represent
a group of equally entitled persons who find themselves in a group
with a common interest. The court added that it would be against the
principles of good faith if one purchaser received more at the expense
of the others Since the court stressed that the claimants enjoyed equal
contractual rights and belonged to a group entitled to raise the claim,
only those claimants who have concluded a contract with the obligor,
and not his regular customers, will benefit from the pro-rata allocation.
3. England
While legal writers support the principles existing in the United
States for pro-rata performance," English case law has not developed
any fixed precedents in this respect.
In the decision The Super Servant Two, Dillon L.J. dealt with
this problem and rejected the remedy of pro-rata performance for frus-
tration. He reasoned that the contract is terminated with the occur-
rence of the contractual breakdown. He stated that the party relying
on this could not subsequently incur an obligation to make an appro-
priate allocation. It therefore follows that the obligor is either com-
pletely discharged or must completely perform his contractual duties.
The problems this rule creates are made clear by the Super-Ser-
vant-Two case. If the defendant had only named one ship in the con-
tract, then he would have been discharged from performance. The
same would be true if both ships had sunk. With the sinking of only
one ship he can, even as a matter of fact, only fulfil one part of the
contract; but this is not considered a sufficient excuse. Accordingly, it
would have been better for the defendant in this case if both ships had
sunk. 66
62. RGZ 84, 129.
63. Now called the "Federal Supreme Court".
64. A. H. Hudson, Prorating in the English Law of Frustrated Contracts, 31
MOD. L. REV. 535, 543 (1968).
65. [1990] 1 Ll. L.R. 1, 13-14




In contrast, the principle of pro-rata performance has been applied
in contracts with exemption clauses. In Tennants, Ltd. v. Wilson & Co.
Ltd,.7 the Force Majeure clause provided that the seller can suspend
its supplies when particular Force Majeure events occur. When the
seller, who obtained chemicals from Germany and resold them in Eng-.
land, was no longer able to perform due to the outbreak of the First
World War, one of the purchasers nevertheless sued for specific perfor-
mance. The House of Lords dismissed the claim and allowed a pro-rata
performance to be effected because, according to the Court, the seller
was either obligated to all of his contracting partners in the same way
or was obligated to none of them. Therefore, the chronological sequence
of the contracts was irrelevant.68
There is, however, uncertainty as to how the allocation is to be
carried out. In general, no specific method is required; rather, the
Courts allow the seller a measure of discretion in light of the individu-
al circumstances of each case. The only requirement is that a reason-
able allocation be used in the particular case. 9 Accordingly, an equal
treatment of all contracting partners is not absolutely necessary. The
means of allocation can also take into account when the contracts were
concluded. 0 Moreover, allocation can also be done solely on a mathe-
matically equal basis without taking into account the content and the
scope of the contracts.71
III. ANNULMENT OF THE CONTRACT
Whereas a termination of all contractual duties is seen as the last
option in both German and Swiss law, this is the primary remedy in
Anglo-American law. Accordingly, the requirements for an annulment
of the contract are different.
One consequence of contract annulment is the reversal of perfor-
mances already effected. In this respect there are significant differ-
ences, in particular in English law, on the question of which services
performed are to be reimbursed. This ultimately led to the passing of
the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943.
67. Tenants Ltd. v. Wilson & Co. Ltd., [1917] A.C. 495.
68. Id. at 512.
69. Intertradex S.A. v. Lesieur-Tourteaux S.A.R.L., [1977] 2 Ll. L.R. 146, 155
(Donaldson, J.).
70. Id.
71. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Continental Grain Co., [19831 1 Ll. L.R.
269, 281.
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A. Requirements for Contract Annulment
1. Anglo-American law
Both English and American law, in the event of significant frus-
tration, only annul the contract at the time of frustration:
"[firustration brings the contract to an end forthwith, without more
and automatically."72 The rationale for this is that the resulting con-
tractual certainty should make cases of frustration predictable.
2. Germany
In German law, contract annulment replaces contract adjustment
where the adjustment alone is insufficient to avoid a result incompati-
ble with the principle of good faith and where this aim can only be
achieved by discharging the aggrieved party from the contract. This
occurs when the adjustment of the transaction leads to an obligation
on one or both parties which can no longer be justified.
In the Vigogne7" spinning case, one partner in a commercial part-
nership had entered into an obligation in favor of a third party in a
preliminary contract, whereby, after the termination of the partnership
agreement and in the course of the distribution of the partnership
assets he would purchase a certain piece of property and sell it to the
third party at a fixed price. During the distribution of the partnership
assets inflation forced the partner to pay a much higher price than
that fixed in the preliminary contract. On this basis, he refused to
perform because the high rate of inflation had frustrated the fulfill-
ment of the contract.
The Supreme Court examined whether or not the contract could
be preserved with altered conditions.74 The Court said that the obligor
could only be discharged from his obligations if further performance of
the contract would significantly contravene the principle of good faith
and continue to bind the obligor either because the factual situation
would not permit an adjustment or because the obligee refused to con-
sent to an adjustment.75
3. Switzerland
a. The Acceptance of Contract Annulment
Textbooks and case law regard contract annulment as the usual
72. J. Lauritzen A.S. v. Wijsmuller B.V., [1990] 1 Li, L.R. 1, 8.
73. RG 3.2.1922, RGZ 103, 328.
74. RGZ 103, 333, 334.
75. See also RG 12.5.1928, RGZ 121, 141.
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legal consequence" of the application of the principle clausula rebus
sic stantibus7 This is the normal reaction to determining that a con-
tract is unenforceable because of events following conclusion. The rules
for interpretation of statutory gaps allow the judge to annul the con-
tract by creating a rule in accordance with Art. 1 (2) of the Swiss Civil
Code, which gives the aggrieved party a right to give notice of termina-
tion or to annul the contract directly. 8
b. Restrictions on Annulment of the Contract
The judge's fundamental freedom to create an adjustment rule to
annul the contract is restricted by the wishes of the parties. This is the
case, when one party has already accepted the unfavorable effects of
altering the contract "by agreeing to the appropriate adjustment of the
contract. "7 9 The other contracting party cannot then in good faith re-
fuse to continue performance of the contract. Therefore, the judge can-
not annul the contract by formulating a rule under Art. 1 (2) of the
Swiss Civil Code. In addition, the principle of private autonomy pro-
hibits an annulment of the contract where both parties agree to the
preservation of the contract,80 but cannot agree on the means of pre-
serving the contract. The judge must then adjust the contents of the
contract to the changed circumstances with the greatest possible ad-
herence to its binding nature as determined by the parties.
Accordingly, the question of the legal effect of annulling the con-
tract arises when 1) the intent of the parties regarding the preserva-
tion and continuation of the contract cannot be determined, 2) the
parties wish to annul the contract, but the further consequences (e.g.,
damages) are in dispute, or 3) one party needs to continue the contract
but is not prepared to accept the risk.
B. Reversal of performances already made
If the Courts acknowledge the existence of significant Force Ma-
jeure, which leads to an annulment of the contract, then they must de-
cide which of the performances already made need to be reversed.
1. England
76. BISCHOFF, supra note 17, at 230.
77. JAGGI & GAUCH, supra note 18, at no. 635 on § 18 Law of Obligations.
78. Id.
79. BISCHOFF, supra note 17, at 230.
80. See also BGE 47 II 319, (Switz.).
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a. Common Law
On the basis of annulment of the contract ex nunc at common law
the parties cannot only keep the benefits already received, but they
can also maintain their claims to obligations which became due before
the frustration. At this point, any obligations not yet due can no longer
be claimed.
Chandler v. Webster"1 is the leading case for this rigid rule. On
the occasion of the coronation of King Edward VII, a room with a view
over the coronation procession was rented. The contract provided that
the tenant was to pay the whole rental of £ 141 before the procession
took place. After he had only paid £ 100, the whole event was post-
poned.
Because the contract had only been annulled upon the occurrence
of the frustrating event, the Court, relying on the tenant's duty of
advance performance, decided that the tenant was under an obligation
to pay the remaining sum. Thus, all debts owed before the occurrence
of the event remain: the loss lies where it falls. This was justified on
the grounds that the seller, despite being released from performance,
still had the burden of preparing for performance and consequently
had also to perform work which could be reimbursed. Because of the
burdens of preparation, the court did not find a total failure of consid-
eration, which would have led to the conclusion that no valid contract
had existed. Accordingly, it is inappropriate to explain this case on the
basis of the principle of consideration.82
Although the Court in Chandler based its opinion for a termina-
tion ex nunc on old precedents, this decision has been criticized many
times as inequitable." It forces a debtor to continue paying, although
he can expect no counter-performance. Furthermore, the debtor has no
possibility of obtaining a refund for payments already made or of re-
ceiving compensation. In contrast, an obligor who has to perform in
kind can obtain substantial advantages with this arrangement under
certain circumstances. If the performance, as in the coronation case,
can be rendered later, then he obtains a double renumeration for his
performance.
It took 38 years, however, before this decision was overturned by
the Fibrosa case." This case involved a British company that had en-
tered into an obligation in July, 1939, to deliver machines to a Polish
81. [1904] 1 K.B. 493.
82. ERNST RABEL, DAS RECHT DES WARENVERKAUFS, Vol. I, 369 n.5
(1964).
83. R.G. McElroy, Glanville L. Williams, The Coronation Cases-H, 5 MOD. L.
REV. 1, (1941).
84. Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbain Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd., [1943] A.C.
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company. A third of the total price of £ 4800 was paid in advance. The
German occupation of Poland made it impossible for the English sup-
plier to deliver, thus, frustrating the contract. The House of Lords
decided that the Polish plaintiff could demand his advance payment
because the absolute failure of performance by the English company
constituted a total failure of consideration.85 This means that the
plaintiff, if he has received no counter-performance at all so that no
contract was performed, can demand advance payments back under a
quasi-contract theory.88
Since the Court, however, only allowed recovery in cases of a total
failure of consideration, the principle laid down in Chandler will con-
tinue to apply with all of its disadvantages for common law cases in
which only a small counter-performance is effected.87 The Court saw
the inequity in cases where one party has already incurred expenses in
reliance on the implementation of the contract;88 it therefore request-
ed that Parliament pass a law to eliminate these inequities.89 The
Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 accomplished that pur-
pose.'
b. Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 (L.R.F.C.A.)
The most important sections of this Act provide:
Section 1
(1) All sums paid or payable to any party in pursuance of the
contract before the time when the parties were so discharged8 '
shall, in the case of sums so paid, be recoverable from him as the
money received by him for the use of the party by whom the sums
were paid, and, in the case of sums so payable, cease to be so pay-
able:
Provided that, if the party to whom the sums were paid or
payable incurred expenses before the time of discharge in, or for
the purpose of, the performance of the contract, the court may, if it
considers it just to do so having regard to all the circumstances of
the case, allow him to retain or, as the case may be, recover the
whole or any part of the sums so paid or payable, not being an
amount in excess of the expenses so incurred.
(2) Where any party to the contract has, by reason of anything
done by any other party thereto in, or for the purpose of, the per-
formance of the contract, obtained a valuable benefit 2 before the
85. Id. at 48.
86. A. Goodhart, Mistake and Frustration in English Contract Law, in: FS ffir A.
Simonius 99, 105 (1955).
87. SER ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 366 (1978).
88. Chandler, [1904] 1 K.B. 493 at 49, 55.
89. Id. at 50, 57.
90. RAUH, supra note 4, at 137.
91. In this Act it is referred to as "the time of discharge."
92. This excludes a payment of money to which the last foregoing subsection ap-
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time of discharge, there shall be recoverable from him by the said
other party such sum (if any), not exceeding the value of the said
benefit to the party obtaining it, as the court considers just, having
regard to all the circumstances of the case and, in particular,
(a) the amount of any expenses incurred before the time of
discharge by the benefited party in, or for the purpose of, the per-
formance of the contract, including any sums paid or payable by
him to any other party in pursuance of the contract and retained or
recoverable by that party under the last foregoing subsection, and
(b) the effect, in relation to the said benefit, of the circum-
stances giving rise to the frustration of the contract.
The Fibrosa decision is contained in § 1(2), which provides for
recovery of advance payments. The statute, however, goes further by
allowing a claim for a reversal of performances already made, where
only partial failure of consideration exists.93
Section 1(3), which in contrast to § 1(2) provides for the reim-
bursement of non-pecuniary amounts, was the subject of extensive dis-
cussion in B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Hunt,9 so far the only
opinion on the L.R.F.C.A. The very complex facts are as follows: In
December 1957, the Libyan government granted the defendant a li-
cense to search for and extract crude oil from a certain area of the
desert. Since Mr. Hunt did not have sufficient resources to invest in
such a large area, he concluded a company agreement with the plain-
tiffs, designated as a farm-in-agreement. The contract provided that
the costs for the exploration and development of the license area and
the extraction should be borne equally by the parties. Also, the oil
extracted would be divided equally among the parties.
In accordance with the contract, the plaintiff advanced the initial
costs for development. The defendant was to reimburse this money
after extraction of the oil had begun by transferring crude oil from his
share of the amount extracted. B.P. was thereby to receive "reimburse-
ment oil"95 for the share of the costs of the search for oil, which were
to be borne by Hunt until B.P had recovered 125% of its initial expen-
diture. This covered B.P.'s risk in the event no oil was discovered. Ulti-
mately, oil was extracted starting in 1967. The new Libyan govern-
ment, under Gaddafi, expropriated the plaintiff in 1971 and the de-
fendant two years later, declaring the oil industry nationalized. In
response, B.P. sued based on frustration and demanded repayment of a
sum to be equitably determined by the Court in accordance with sec-
tion 1 (3) L.R.F.C.A.
Sir Robert Goff, who felt that the main purpose of the law was to
plies.
93. GOFF & JONES, supra note 87, at 565.
94. B.P. Exploration Co. v. Hunt, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783.
95. To be taken at the rate of three-eighths of Mr. Hunt's share.
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avoid the unjust enrichment of one of the parties," took a two-step
approach. First, he determined and measured the benefit received and
measured it in monetary terms. He, thereby, interpreted the central
concept of § 1(3)-valuable benefit-in such a way that only the end-prod-
uct of the services performed and received by the other party, and not
the services themselves, was to be considered in assessing the benefit.
He based his view on the fact that § 1 (3) did not put the plaintiffs
performance on an equal footing with the defendant's benefit, but dis-
tinguished between the two. 7
The focus on the end-product alone has, however, brought criti-
cism.98 In particular, according to this opinion, there can be no valu-
able benefit in those cases where no end-product has been produced. If,
for example, a house was destroyed by fire shortly before its comple-
tion, the contractor would receive nothing." Consequently, all perfor-
mances made must be taken into consideration when evaluating the
benefit. This argument was irrelevant in this situation, since Mr. Hunt
received a benefit. This benefit consisted of the value of the crude oil
he received and the compensation paid by the Libyan government.'0°
This amounted to almost $85,000,000.00.
Sir Robert Goff next determined a sum which appeared equitable,
but which was independent of the valuable benefit and was not to be
in excess of that amount. In this respect, all the circumstances of the
case were considered.' 01 Accordingly, the judge regarded a sum which
appeared equitable and which at the same time signified a benefit for
the defendant as the appropriate value for the plaintiffs perfor-
mance."° Since part of the money had already gone to B.P. in the
form of oil, Sir Robert Goff set the remaining sum at $35,000,000.00.
2. United States of America
In contrast to English law, American law allows the interests of
the parties to be balanced on the basis of the rights and obligations
accrued before the failure of the contract: "[a] party whose duty of per-
formance does not arise or is discharged as a result of impracticability
of performance, frustration of purpose ... is entitled to restitution for
any benefit that he has conferred on the other party ....
96. BP Exploration Co. v. Hunt, supra note 94, at 799.
97. Id. at 783.
98. A.M. Haycroft & D.M. Waksman, Frustration and Restitution, J. BUS. L. 207,
218-21 (1984).
99. G.H. TREITEL, THE LAw OF CONTRACT 689 (1983).
100. This had to be taken into consideration on the basis of § 1(3)(b).
101. J. Baker, Frustration and Unjust Enrichment, C.L.J. 266, 269 (1979).
102. B.P. Exploration Co. at fn 94.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 377 (1981).
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In Butterfield v. Byron," a contractor was obligated to co-oper-
ate in the construction of a house. Part of the cost was to be paid in
advance and the rest was due when the house was completed. The
building, however, burned down shortly before completion and further
performance of the contract was frustrated. The Court distanced itself
from the English decisions"°5 and held that the contractor was enti-
tled to receive full compensation for the performances already made,
even if payment was not due when the contract was frustrated. The
Court stated, [i(n such a case defendant can recover for work and
material done and furnished on an implied assumption at the contract
rate.""° While recovery of damages for performances effected in ad-
vance is allowed,"°7 recovery of the loss incurred for reliance on a
promise to perform is not permitted."
3. Germany
In German law, the settlement of an annulled contract depends on
the method of the contract's annulment. If the aggrieved party has a
right to terminate on notice, then the annulment of the contract only
takes place when the basis of the transaction has been destroyed.'O°
If the aggrieved party has a right of rescision, the reversal of the con-
tract is effected in accordance with the law of unjust enrichment.1
When the contract is annulled without a legal declaration, it is neces-
sary to differentiate between the types of contracts.
4. Switzerland (Annulment ex nunc)
Case law has yet to answer the question of whether the annul-
ment arrangement constructed by the judge should have legal effects
ex tunc or ex nunc. The opinions represented in legal literature are
contradictory. Neither theoretical nor practical considerations support
the consequences of annulment with effect ex tunc. If the application of
the principle clausula rebus sic stantibus leads to the premature termi-
nation of the contract, it requires that the contract was valid when the
events after the conclusion of the contract occurred, "and there can
104. Butterfield v. Byron, 27 N.E. 667 (Mass. 1891).
105. Id. at 668.
106. Id. at 669.
107. Alabama Football, Inc. v. L.C. Greenwood, 452 F.Supp. 1191, 1196-97 (D. Pa.
1978); West v. People's First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 106 A. 2d 427 (Pa. 1954);
Baer v. United States Lines Co., 43 N.Y.S. 2d 212 (App. Term 1943) (Stating that
performances due before the breakdown of the contract are no longer recoverable).
Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. Churchills, 153 N.Y.S. 264, 265 (App. Term. 1915); Al-
fred Marks Realty Co. v. Hotel Hermitage Co., 156 N.Y.S. 179 (App. Term. 1915);
108. Carroll v. Bowerstock, 164 P. 143 (Kan. 1917); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CON-
TRACTS 704 (1982).
109. BGH 21.11.1968, NJW 1969, 233, 234; BGH 12.6.1987, BGHZ 101, 143, 150
110. BGH 25.10.1989, BGHZ 109, 139, 144; LARENZ, supra note 6, at 186.
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therefore never be a question of terminating it with effect ex tunc.""
In addition, the question of premature annulment of the contract is
important when performance of the typical continuing obligation has
already commenced and the reversal of the transaction therefore pres-
ents difficulties. The contract can only then be terminated with effect
ex nunc.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has shown that the effects of Force Majeure events
vary greatly. Even within a particular national legal system, the out-
come of a Force Majeure event cannot be determined with certainty,
and with the exception of English law the options for the courts are
broad.
The impossibility of determining the legal effect of a Force Ma-
jeure event leads'to great risk for the parties concerned. Given the un-
certainty as to future events, their effects on the parties and their
legal consequences, both parties bear this risk. It is, therefore, highly
advisable that an appropriate clause which deals with the effects of
Force Majeure events be inserted into the contract. As a good example
of the possible wording of such a clause, the Force Majeure Clause
proposed by the ICC is cited. After having stated what will be regard-
ed as a Force Majeure event, this clause goes on to deal with the ef-
fects of a Force Majeure event:
Effects of grounds of relief
6. A ground of relief under this clause relieves the failing party
from damages, penalties and other contractual sanctions, except
from duty to pay interest on money owing as long as and to the
extent that the ground subsists.
7. Further it postpones the time for performance, for such period as
may be reasonable, thereby excluding the other party s right, if
any, to terminate or rescind the contract. In determining what is a
reasonable period, regard shall be had to the failing party's ability
to resume performance, and the other party's interest in receiving
performance despite the delay. Pending resumption of performance
by the failing party the other party may suspend his own perfor-
mance.
8. If the ground of relief subsist for more than such period as the
parties provide [the applicable period to be specified here by the
parties], or in the absence of such provision for longer than a rea-
sonable period, either party shall be entitled to terminate the con-
tract with notice.
9. Each party may retain what he has received from the perfor-
mance of the contract carried out prior to the termination. Each
party must account to the other for any unjust enrichment result-
111. BISCHOFF, supra note 17, at 231.
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ing from such performance. The payment of the final balance shall
be made without delay.
